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Abstract 
Some places have no crime and some have a lot, and thus we study hotspots.  
Corruption is structured differently to crime, but hotspots still are notable.  The 
difference is that hotspots are not places but clusters of activity.  This paper analyses 
corruption cases from New York City to explore a way of identifying such clusters. 
Seventy two cases were coded according to features that represent the elements of the 
crime triangle: offender and motivation, target and opportunity, and place and ability. 
Multidimensional scaling revealed three groups of cases, exhibiting different patterns of 
corrupt activity. Group one involved politicians involved in high value financial 
corruption. Group two primarily involved supervisors who created opportunities 
involving procurement and contracts. Group three involved inspectors, particularly in 
the infrastructure sector, who were involved with low value bribes to violate 
regulations. Each is discussed in relation to situational crime prevention principles to 
develop possible strategies for prevention. 
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Introduction 
 
Corruption causes harm to communities and undermines security.  Where it exists it 
can, among other things, increase the costs of doing business, ration essential services 
unfairly, diminish the quality of social, educational and health services, create unsafe 
infrastructure, cause dreadful harm to the environment, diminish the capacity of local 
and national government, and undermine the rule of law.  It can enrich the powerful and 
impoverish the powerless, and apart from the tangible ill effects, it affronts citizens who 
expect principles, processes and laws to underpin regular authoritative interactions. 
 
While not all corruption is criminal, it is a fertile field for criminologists.  This paper 
proposes that many of the lessons learned in crime prevention can be applied to the 
prevention of corruption.  The examination of crime hotspots has been fruitful for 
exploring propositions for crime prevention, for example for acquisitive crimes such as 
burglary as well (Johnson & Bowers, 2004) as violent crime (Ratcliffe, Taniguchi, 
Groff, & Wood, 2011). This paper argues that there are hotspots in corruption.  
However, these are not necessarily geographical places, as crime hotspots are 
traditionally understood. 
 
The academic literature on corruption spans many disciplines.  From the seminal 
work of Susan Rose Ackerman (1975) on the economics of corruption to more recent 
comprehensive analyses of corruption (see, for example Aidt (2003)). Economists 
have examined corruption in virtually every aspect of macroeconomic and 
microeconomic behavior and in the allocation, distribution and delivery of goods and 
services. Rose-Ackerman (1999) weaves many threads together by examining the 
economic impact of corruption and how high level officials manipulate political 
power and civil service processes, especially in the development context.   
 
Historians and political scientists have documented ancient and recent manifestations 
of the phenomenon (Friedrich, 1972).  Tammany Hall was a euphemism  for 
multifarious corrupt practices (Werner, 1932) while the processes of corruption over 
time were documented in V.O Key’s classic Politics, parties and pressure groups 
(1958).  “Syndromes of corruption” are very usefully identified by political scientist 
Michael Johnston.  While his analysis is on nation states where he uses country level 
data to illustrate his thesis, his syndrome of “influence markets” is relevant in this 
context  (Johnston, 2005, pp. 39-43, ).  Moving from syndromes to cultures, Eric 
Uslaner (2008) demonstrates that people who make corrupt payments feel a sense of 
high inequality and have low trust, and argues that malfeasance derives from the 
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absence of transparency (Uslaner, 2008, p. 9, ). There is also a strong literature on 
corruption in administrative studies, while anthropologists have studied gifts, bribes 
and patronage in different cultures and lawyers have written extensively on the rule 
of law and the jurisprudence surrounding corruption. 
 
While criminologists have been studying white collar crime for over a century, there 
has been little on corruption in the criminological literature until about a decade ago.  
Zimring and Johnson mapped the terrain in 2005, and they distinguished the study of 
corruption from that of white collar crime and from other crime (pp. 805-806. ) . 
Piquero and Albanese (2011) saw similarities between white collar crime and 
corruption in community perception and operations and outlined definitional and 
measurement problems. In their excellent work, The hidden order of corruption, 
Della Porta and Vannucci (2012) devote their longest chapter to corruption and 
organized crime, while Klitgaard et al (2000) bring analyses of corruption issues into 
the context of cities and their administration. 
 
Due to the lack of empirical material that has been analysed, corruption prevention is 
only tentatively finding its way into the criminological literature.  Graycar and 
Prenzler (2013) take a criminological approach to the understanding and prevention 
of corruption while Della Porta and Vannucci (2012) follow a similar theme in trying 
to better understand corruption by breaking down corrupt acts to smaller parts and 
analyzing opportunities and the chain of interaction.  
 
While big sweep discussions talk about changing regimes or constitutions to deal 
with corruption, there is a task for criminologists now to better understand the 
phenomenon and devise preventive strategies. This paper is part of that process. To 
apply lessons learned from crime prevention, the first steps are to understand what the 
concept of “corruption” covers, and to break it down into manageable and tangible 
components.  Corruption primarily is about a breach of trust .  Without getting hung 
up on definitions we can take some of the standard descriptions, “abuse of public 
position/ entrusted office for private gain” (Transparency International, 2010), or 
“unauthorised trading of entrusted authority”  (de Speville, 2010).  Not all corruption, 
however, is the same (Graycar & Prenzler, 2013), and it plays out differently in 
different contexts  It may, therefore, be helpful to see corruption as a set of 
behaviours.  
 
Types of corruption, such as bribery, extortion, misappropriation, self-dealing, 
patronage, abuse of discretion, creating or exploiting conflict of interest, nepotism, 
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clientelism and favouritism occur in the performance of various activities.  Everyday 
activities in which corrupt behaviour can take place include appointing personnel, 
buying things (procurement), delivering programs or services, managing disasters, 
making things (construction / manufacturing), controlling activities (licensing / 
regulation/ issuing of permits), administering (justice for example).  These activities 
take place in public sectors such as health, tax administration, energy regulation and 
delivery, social services, environment & water, customs & immigration, legal system, 
as well as in a host of private sector activities such as banking, agriculture, sports etc.  
And it all occurs in specific places, such as countries, regions, localities, corporations, 
work places etc. 
 
This analysis, known as TASP (type, activity, sector, place) is a working framework for 
the analysis of corruption.  First developed by Graycar and Sidebottom (2012), it sets 
the stage for a situational crime prevention analysis of corruption.  Noting that 
corruption involves doing wrong things, or failing to do something one should do, or 
doing something permissible, but purposely doing it in an improper manner, then the 
unit of analysis should not be corruption in a country or an organisation, or a corrupt 
offender, but rather a corrupt event.   
 
The event may arise from structural features, in which corruption is embedded in 
processes and tolerated, sometimes it is situational and fleetingly opportunistic.  
Sometimes the participants are willing, so the behaviour involves collusion, sometimes 
one participant is unwilling, and thus the behaviour is extortionate.   
 
This paper uses data from an analysis of corrupt events investigated by the New York 
Department of Investigation (Graycar & Villa, 2011).  Work done by the authors 
elsewhere (and not yet published) shows that a substantial proportion of complaints to 
anti-corruption agencies is about corruption in municipal government. It is here that 
opportunities for petty corruption abound, and it is from data in this field that preventive 
models can be built. 
 
In building preventive strategies, this paper argues that situational crime prevention is a 
strong guiding mechanism.  Anti-corruption agencies have a wide remit.  They enforce 
anti-corruption laws, but generally these are fairly limited, and much of the behaviour 
that is policed is criminal, such as theft and embezzlement (de Sousa, 2010).  However, 
anti-corruption is bigger than theft, or poor governance, or poor service standards or 
unsafe environments.  It is about limiting opportunities to behave corruptly and 
strengthening guardianship.  Investigation and prosecution can go on forever, but there 
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is more mileage in limiting opportunities and changing attitudes that underpin and shape 
behaviour.  Therefore, preventive and educational components necessarily complement 
any enforcement activity and, if success is to be ensured, they should overshadow 
enforcement.  While anticorruption agencies were typically established to respond to 
corruption on a case-by-case basis, they are increasingly moving into the realms of 
analysis and prevention. 
 
Theoretical perspective: Situational Crime Prevention 
 
The purpose of this paper is to suggest that Situational Crime Prevention (SCP), with its 
underlying framework and methodology, could offer a tool to aid anticorruption 
agencies in their prevention function. The paper focuses particularly on a potential 
methodology for analysing the corruption problem to inform the tailoring of solutions. 
 
Situational crime prevention (SCP) draws on environmental criminology perspectives to 
focus on the crime environment, rather than the offender, utilising “an analysis of the 
circumstances giving rise to specific kinds of crime” in order to “reduce the opportunity 
for those crimes to occur” (Clarke, 1997, p.2). SCP draws on rational choice theory, 
routine activity theory and crime pattern theory. Rational Choice Theory (Cornish & 
Clarke, 2003) views offenders as rational decision makers who conduct cost-benefit 
analyses that influence their offending choices. Routine Activity Theory (Cohen & 
Felson, 1979) explains how offenders, targets and locations converge to create 
opportunities for crime. For example, Clarke and Eck’s (2003) crime triangle explains 
that crime occurs when a motivated offender and suitable target converge in an 
opportune place in the absence of effective guardianship.  
 
Crime Pattern Theory draws upon the rational choice and routine activity theories to 
explain that crimes do not occur randomly across geographical and temporal contexts, 
but that patterns of convergence can be seen in the existence of crime ‘hotspots’ 
(Brantingham & Brantingham, 2008). Identification of such hotspots, through 
systematic data analysis, allows responses to focus resources where they will have the 
greatest impact; that is, targeting prevention efforts in a focused area that accounts for 
the greatest majority of the problem. Thus, analysing a number of incidents for patterns 
helps to identify commonalities between cases that can be addressed, rather than 
responding to incidents on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Clarke (1997, p4) describes SCP as comprising  
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opportunity-reducing measures that (1) are directed at highly specific forms 
of crime, (2) involve the management, design or manipulation of the 
immediate environment in as systematic and permanent way as possible, (3) 
make crime more difficult and risky, or less rewarding and excusable as 
judged by a wide range of offenders”.  
Each of these aspects will be discussed briefly below in relation to the present paper’s 
focus on preventing corruption. 
 
Specifying forms of corruption. Clarke (1997, p.4) states the importance of making 
distinctions not just between crime types, but within crime types, in order to tailor 
prevention efforts:  
Situational measures must be tailored to highly specific categories of crime, 
which means that distinctions must be made, not between broad categories 
such as burglary and robbery, but rather between the different kinds of 
offenses falling under each of these categories. (p.4) 
 
Thus, it is important that incidents of public sector corruption are not treated as a 
homologous group, but that different forms of corrupt activity are recognised. For 
example, Ede, Homel and Prenzler (2002) found that grouping police complaint cases 
by allegation type allowed identification of deficiencies common to particular types of 
police misconduct. These deficiencies were then used to suggest possible situational 
prevention techniques. It is the purpose of this paper to propose a systematic method for 
exploring the existence of public sector corruption ‘sub-categories’ within the context of 
SCP, and to identify what those sub-categories might be. Thus, ‘hotspots’ (of 
corruption) are not regarded as physical locations, but patterns of activity that represent 
particular vulnerabilities to types of working environments, such as jobs, positions, or 
sectors.  
 
Clark and Eck’s (2003) crime triangle elements, mentioned above, can aid in 
understanding the nature of events, to identify what might be targeted with prevention 
efforts. Carmel-Gilfilen (2013, p.84) describes an inner crime triangle composed of the 
offender, place and target, and an outer triangle composed of desire, ability and 
opportunity, respectively, that “represents the environmental circumstances that can be 
adapted in order to deter [offending]”. We propose that details of the Offender, Target 
and Place provide information on the ‘who’ ‘what’ and ‘where’, of corruption events, 
while details of the Desire, Opportunity and Ability provide information on ‘how’ 
corruption can surface. These are all elements that can be targeted for prevention. 
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 Targeting the environment for corruption and impacting offender decision-making. 
Understanding the most common sub-categories, or patterns, of corrupt activity can lead 
to informed decisions regarding how to prevent the majority of incidents. Work on 
Situational Crime Prevention has established 25 prevention techniques that can be 
drawn upon to impact on the crime environment (Cornish & Clarke, 2003). These draw 
on five principles of situational crime prevention. These are to: increase the effort to 
behave corruptly; increase the risks of corrupt behaviour; reduce the rewards of corrupt 
behaviour; reduce provocations of corrupt behaviour; and, remove excuses for corrupt 
behaviour. The techniques and principles can be drawn upon to design prevention 
efforts for corruption, tailored towards specific corruption sub-categories. 
 
Aims of the study 
 
The aim of the current study, therefore, is to investigate the applicability of Situational 
Crime Prevention to the prevention of corruption. It will do this by exploring a method 
for considering ‘hotspots’ of corruption, in accordance with Clarke’s (1997) principle of 
first making distinctions within crime types. The method will use the elements of the 
crime triangle to identify patterns in the frequency with which certain elements 
converge that may produce or encourage corruption. If there are discernible patterns to 
these elements, then this would suggest that ‘hotspot’ analysis of this kind might be a 
beneficial way for anti-corruption agencies to identify the common problems in their 
jurisdictions. The resultant model will be used to suggest possible ways of preventing 
corruption, drawing on the principles and techniques of situational crime prevention, 
which can be tested in further research. 
 
Method 
 
The cases that comprise this study were taken from the Department of Investigation 
(DOI) of the City of New York. This is a large and traditional anti-corruption agency, 
which focuses both on administrative and political corruption.  Founded in 1873 to 
serve as an independent and non-partisan watchdog for the New York City 
government, the DOI is one of the oldest law enforcement agencies in the US.  The 
DOI consists of attorneys, investigators, forensic auditors, computer forensic 
specialists and administrative personnel. 
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Over the years, New York City officials (like many city officials elsewhere) had 
gained notoriety for perpetrating corruption, fraud, bribery and theft with impunity.  
The DOI therefore, and was specifically delegated the role of dealing promptly and 
effectively with cases of corruption which were eating into the coffers of the city 
government (New York City, 2010) Its main role is to combat corruption in public 
institutions in New York City and ensure that public officials do not use their position 
for private gain. 
 
The cases were originally collected by Graycar & Villa  (2011). That study 
commenced with one hundred cases which the DOI had investigated and which had 
been successfully prosecuted.  Beginning with cases in 2009 and going backwards, 
100 cases were selected in chronological order, and only open source information 
was used to inform the descriptions and analysis.  The 100 cases occurred between 
2007 and 2009.  While no interviews were conducted with offenders, in order to 
inform the analysis discussions were held with DOI personnel   The cases were not 
randomly selected or assigned.  However, not all were corruption cases. Twenty-eight 
cases were eliminated because they were criminal activities such as assault, theft, 
fraud or forgery.  We eliminated those that could have occurred in any corporation or 
employment context.  These cases were not assessed as corrupt acts, since they did 
not primarily involve the misuse of a public function to gain access to a criminal 
opportunity.  (details of this study are in Graycar & Villa 2011). 
 
The final sample of 72 cases involved more than 72 perpetrators. Some examples of 
the type of cases are: 
 
• A technician accepted a $100 bribe to alter drug test results. Her 
role was to collect urine samples as part of pre-employment 
testing of all job applicants for the New York City Housing 
Authority. 
• A factory operator offered $700 to a Department of Buildings 
(DOB) boiler inspector to overlook unsafe boiler violations in 
the factory. 
• Seven employees of the New York City Human Resources 
Administration/ Department of Social Services and eight other 
individuals generated Medicaid cards (meant for the city’s 
neediest and most vulnerable people) in exchange for a cash fee 
of approximately $300-$400 per card. This scheme led to the 
Medicaid Program losing an estimated $3.9 million.  
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• A New York State assembly woman offered her help to a private 
contractor to acquire city-owned land in her district and in 
exchange the contractor had to build a house for her valued in 
$500,000 
 (Graycar & Villa, 2011, p. 424-425) 
 
Strengths and limitations of the data 
 
The sample reflects a specific sub-sample of corruption cases; that is, those that have 
been investigated and resolved (successfully prosecuted) by a particular agency in New 
York City. Thus, as Graycar and Villa (2011, p.425) point out,  
...these cases are not a representation of all the corruption that exists in 
New York City, but rather a representation of the cases that have been 
investigated by the City’s watchdog agency.   
Indeed, corruption by its nature is secretive and difficult to expose, therefore any dataset 
of corruption incidents is likely to suffer in its representativeness. However, the purpose 
of the present study is to explore the applicability of a method that anti-corruption 
agencies could potentially use themselves to inform their understanding of problems in 
their jurisdictions. The use of data from an anti-corruption agency, therefore, provides 
an ecologically valid sample for this endeavour.  
 
Data coding 
 
The coding framework utilised for the present study was developed from Carmel-
Gilfilen’s (2013) version of the crime triangle, shown in Fig 1, which incorporates “a 
suitable target with opportunity available, the ability to acquire this product in a specific 
place and desire on the part of the offender to complete the crime” (p. 83, emphasis 
added). Variables relating to each of these six elements were extracted from Graycar 
and Villa’s (2011) coded data. The variable labels are kept consistent with that paper, 
while the levels within the variables have been modified to suit the present analysis; for 
example, some categories have been collapsed to avoid low frequencies and to reduce 
complexity.  
 
 [Insert Figure 1 here] 
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Table 1 shows the six variables chosen to represent the elements of interest. The 
‘offender’ element was characterised by the ‘type of public servant involved’. The 
‘desire’, or motivation, was characterised by the ‘value of the bribe or kickback’. The 
variable ‘nature of activity’ related to the ‘target’ in that it describes whether the target 
was ‘regulations’ (that were controlled or implemented), ‘procurement/contracts’, or 
‘finance’ (i.e. stealing or misusing money). The ‘opportunity’ for the crime is 
represented by the ‘process’ variable, which describes whether the person ‘violated 
procedure’ or ‘proactively created the opportunity’ for him/herself. The ‘place’ for the 
crime, rather than being the physical location, is taken to be the ‘sector’ in which the 
person was working. Finally, the ‘ability’ is reflected in the ‘nature of the infraction’, 
that is, the ‘violation’, ‘theft,’ or ‘abuse of influence’ that was enabled by the 
individual’s position.  
 
All variable levels (categories) are mutually exclusive so that a case can only be coded 
as belonging to one level (for example a case cannot involve both a high and a low 
bribe). Each of the 72 cases was coded according to the six variables in table 1. This 
yielded a data matrix of 72 by 6; each case being represented by a profile of scores 
across the six variables. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Data Analysis 
 
The data were analysed in two stages. Stage 1 provides a descriptive analysis of the 
frequency with which each variable category occurs in the data. This shows the overall 
variation among the cases.  
 
Stage 2 provides an analysis of how all six variables combine. This analyses the profiles 
of variables in all cases, to explore whether certain profiles are more common than 
others, and whether certain combinations of variables can be said to form distinct 
‘types’. Profiles use the numerical codes that represent the categories (outlined in Table 
1) and show the combination of variable categories that make up each case. For 
example, if a case involved an inspector, a low value bribe, targeting regulations, 
violating procedure, in the infrastructure sector, and violating regulations, that case 
would have a profile of 111111. If, however, the infraction was theft, the profile would 
be 111112. Thus, each case has a profile, but two cases that have the same features 
would have the same profile. Profile analysis is, therefore, multivariate. The strength of 
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this is the ability to look at the relationships between all the variables simultaneously, in 
contrast to bivariate techniques that allow only the relationship between chosen pairs of 
variables. Multivariate analysis allows exploration of patterns of co-occurrence between 
all the aspects of interest, using only one procedure rather than multiple comparisons 
that may suffer from familywise error. 
 
Stage 1 analysis revealed that data were missing on at least one variable for 8 of the 
cases. These cases were excluded from the profile analysis, leaving 64 cases. The 64 
cases have 26 different profiles; these, and their frequencies, are shown in table 2. 
 
The patterns among these 26 profiles were analysed using the multidimensional scaling 
(MDS) technique of Multidimensional Structuple Analysis (MSA) using the Hebrew 
University Data Analysis Package (HUDAP). MSA analyses the similarities among the 
profiles and plots these in a two dimensional space; this pictorial presentation of the 
data aids interpretation. The MSA plot shows all unique profiles as points in the space. 
Cases that are exactly the same (same profile) are represented by the same point in the 
plot. The more similar profiles are to each other, the closer together they appear in the 
plot. The actual space, therefore, is arbitrary; it is the distances between the points that 
can be interpreted.  
 
The profile plot can, therefore, be analysed for particular groupings of points based on 
these relative distances (groupings of points that are close together, and separated from 
other groupings of points). Cases within groupings will share similar features. This will 
be evident when looking at how the cases in each group score on each variable (e.g. do 
they all involve the same type of person, or motivation? etc.). To do this, the main plot 
is accompanied by separate item plots; one for each of the six variables in the analysis. 
These item plots show the same configuration of points in the space, but show how each 
case (profile point) scored on that variable.  This information can be used to see how the 
cases relate to each other; particularly why certain groups of cases can be identified as 
distinct from other groups, and in what ways. For further explanation of MSA and 
examples of its use see Guttman & Greenbaum (1998) and Porter & Warrender (2009) 
 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Results 
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 Descriptive analysis 
 
The six variables explored in this study revealed variation across the 72 cases, as shown 
by the frequencies in table 1. The most common features of the cases include the 
involvement of inspectors (49%), low value bribes under US$10,000 (68%), and 
activity relating to controlling or implementing regulations (72%). Most frequently the 
cases involved a violation of procedure (64%), rather than creating the opportunity 
(36%), and were in the infrastructure sector (42%), although human services and health 
and environment sectors were also commonly involved (29% and 28%, respectively). 
Finally, about three quarters of the sample involved violating regulations, with smaller 
numbers involved in theft and abuse of influence. 
 
Profile analysis (MSA) 
 
In terms of the case profiles, almost half of the cases had one of only two profiles (see 
table 2) with the remaining cases exhibiting more varied profiles. In order to explore 
how all the cases relate to one another (and not just the most common), the data were 
analysed with MSA.  The MSA of the profiles of the 64 cases across the six variables 
resulted in a two-dimensional MSA solution with coefficient of contiguity 0.998 
(indicating that the solution is a very good representation of the actual relationships 
between the variables) (Figure 2). The dispersion of the points in the main plot suggests 
three groups of cases can be discerned, based upon their positions in the plot. The item 
plots (Figure 3) provide detail on the differences between these three groups that make 
them distinct from one another.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Group 1 contains 5 cases, group 2 contains 14 cases and group 3 contains 45 cases. The 
main plot and the item plots have been partitioned to illustrate these three groups and 
table 3 summarises the features that describe each. While on some features the groups 
show high internal consistency (all cases in the group score the same) and 
distinctiveness (cases in a group score differently to cases not in the group), other 
features are less discerning. 
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Group 1 consists of only five cases but was distinctive in that it contained all cases 
involving politicians. These cases all involved the creation of the opportunity, and all 
cases involved high value (over US$10,000) bribes/kickbacks. In four out of the five 
cases the target was financial, and in four of the five cases this was enabled through 
abuse of their political influence. Most commonly, these cases involved the human 
service sector, although one case involved infrastructure and one the whole of 
government. An example case that typifies this group is as follows: 
A State Senator used his position and influence to obtain financing funds for two 
non-profit organizations. Part of this money was diverted to pay his personal 
expenses for an amount of approximately USD $ 575,000.In that example, the 
politician creates the opportunity, with his position enabling him misappropriate 
funds for his private use. In another case, a New York State assembly woman used 
her position in her district to help a private contractor acquire state owned land. In 
exchange for this, the contractor had to build her a house valued at US$500,000. 
 
Group 2 consists of 14 cases and, while some distinct patterns can be seen within the 
group, it did show somewhat more variation across the variable categories. The majority 
(approximately two thirds) of the cases in this group involved supervisors, high value 
bribes/kickbacks, procurement and administrating contracts in the human services 
sector, and a creation of the opportunity that amounted to theft. However, up to a third 
of cases showed some variation on these features. An example case that typifies this 
group is as follows: 
Supervisor of adoptions at the City Administration for Children’s Services 
fabricated adoption cases, authorizing undue payments for a total of USD $ 
411,775, in exchange for receiving a portion of that money. 
Other examples include employees of the City’s Health and Hospitals Corporation 
(HHC) selling confidential patient information to personal injury attorneys, and the 
head of a construction company falsifying contract documents to avoid an obligation to 
subcontract part of the work, and keep the full contract payment amount. 
 
Group 3 consists of the largest number of cases (n= 45). All cases in this group 
involved low value bribes/kickbacks, all related to controlling or implementing 
regulations and all violated regulations. Those involved were typically inspectors (71%) 
or low level workers (27%) who violated procedures (80%) rather than creating the 
opportunity. While there was some variation in the sector involved, almost half 
involved the infrastructure sector. Further, this group is the only group of the three that 
includes cases from the health and environment sector. An example case that typifies 
this group is as follows: 
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An Inspector of the City Department of Buildings (DOB) was offered a 
US$300 payment to not issue a violation and stop work order for failing 
constructions plans. 
This example clearly shows an inspector in the infrastructure sector who, rather 
than creating an opportunity for corruption, is offered a low value bribe in 
exchange for violating procedures (not issuing the violation and stop work order). 
The violation concerned the inspector not implementing the regulations regarding 
construction plans. 
 
A further example can be seen in the case of a low-level employee of the City 
Department of Parks and Recreation (DPR) who received a low value bribe of 
$120 from a person obligated to perform community service (Human Services 
sector) as part of an alternative sentence program. The aim of the bribe was to let 
the person leave early without performing the services. This would constitute a 
violation of procedures through not enforcing the regulations that govern 
community service program.  
 
Discussion 
 
This paper analysed public sector corruption cases from the New York Department of 
Investigation to identify common themes that may indicate opportunities for targeted 
prevention. Using the framework of the crime triangle, three groups of cases were 
distinguished in the data, based upon different combinations of features relating to the 
‘offender’, ‘target’ and ‘place’ (sector). Thus, the crime triangle framework was 
successful in identifying three different ‘hotspots’ of corruption; that is, three primary 
ways in which offenders, locations and opportunities for corruption converged in the 
sample cases. The presence of such hotspots shows that, while not all corruption 
incidents are the same, equally they are not all unique. This means that, instead of 
responding to corruption on a case-by-case basis, prevention can be focused toward 
broad types of activity. Thus, prevention can be tailored to each particular type (based 
on the particular elements involved) to increase effectiveness, as well as targeted at the 
most frequent (or likely) types, to prevent the most cases. To illustrate this approach, the 
primary focus of this discussion will be to show how each of the three types identified 
might best be prevented, drawing on the principles and techniques of situational crime 
prevention.  
 
As noted in the introduction, situational crime prevention (SCP) has a number of 
principles that would be applicable to the prevention of corruption. The three chosen 
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here are to: increase the effort to behave corruptly; increase the risks of corrupt 
behaviour; and reduce the rewards of corrupt behaviour. These principles are discussed 
in relation to corruption (Graycar and Prenzler 2013) and it is clear that certain 
strategies are likely to apply to a number of different forms of corruption; for example, 
increasing guardianship through transparency and accountability of processes, and 
reducing rewards through introducing penalties for corrupt behaviour. The analysis 
presented in this paper shows that such strategies can be targeted to particular forms of 
behaviour by particular people (positions) in particular sectors. Each of the three groups 
of cases are summarized and discussed in terms of proposed avenues for prevention 
encompassing the SCP principles (summarised in table 4). 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Group 1: politicians 
 
In the sample analysed, politicians were most vulnerable to high level financial 
corruption, due to their position of political influence. While comprising only a small 
proportion of cases, the financial cost associated with these incidents was high, with 
further potential cost to public confidence in government. The focus of these cases on 
high personal financial gain would suggest that the prevention principle of decreasing 
the rewards may be particularly effective. Strategies to achieve this might include large 
financial penalties, exclusion from future employment in the political/government 
sphere, as well as moral penalties, such as public naming and shaming. Further, the 
risks of such behaviour could be increased, for example through mandatory financial 
audits of both personal and business accounts of politicians. 
 
Group 2: Supervisors 
 
The data showed that supervisors, particularly in the Human Services sector, can create 
opportunities around procurement and administrating contracts that amount to high 
value theft and distortion of policy priorities. This suggests that those working in this 
field might need greater guardianship in terms of accountability mechanisms that could 
increase the risks and effort, as well as reduce the rewards. For example, using a process 
of layered decision-making, particularly for contracts that represent a high value, could 
increase the visibility of supervisors’ decisions and reduce individual discretion. The 
setting and enforcement of procurement guidelines, including the use of penalties for 
procurement breaches could also be effective. Regular and random audits of accounts 
may also increase the risk of exposure of theft. 
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Group3: Inspectors 
 
Group three suggested that NYC inspectors are vulnerable to low value bribes to violate 
regulations, due to their decision-making positions, particularly in the infrastructure 
sector but also within the health and environment sector. This group was revealed to be 
the most common type among the sample cases. While involving low value 
bribes/kickbacks, the damage resulting from such cases could be extensive. For 
example, overlooking building code or environmental violations could seriously affect 
public safety. 
 
Given that these cases typically involve violations rather than individuals creating 
opportunities, effective prevention might be targeted at increasing the effort and risks 
associated with such violations. This could include mechanisms of oversight to increase 
the transparency and accountability of inspectors’ decisions. Rotation of inspectors for 
particular jobs may also increase the effort and risk necessary for those offering bribes, 
as each inspection will involve a new person to be approached. Further, while 
bribes/kickbacks were of low value, there are possible strategies to reduce the rewards. 
For example, removing pension rights of convicted employees might make low value 
bribes less attractive, as this would ensure too low a reward for the risk involved.  
 
Limitations and further research 
 
This paper presents an empirical investigation of the utility of the crime triangle 
framework to identify ‘hotspots’ of corruption activity.  The, application of situational 
crime prevention principles, discussed above, can now be tested in the field. Such 
testing could involve experimental intervention studies, where prevention techniques 
are tested against an adequate control group, and with suitable pre- and post-
intervention measures. An alternative may be to conduct in-depth case analysis of what 
prevention strategies were in place when corruption incidents have occurred (to see 
what was ineffective), with the further possibility of comparing these circumstances to 
similar departments who have not experienced similar incidents of corruption. This 
would involve the support of anti-corruption agencies, and in the experience of the 
authors this support is likely to be willingly forthcoming. 
 
The method for uncovering the patterns found in the NYC cases can be applied to any 
data set of cases that have enough detail to inform knowledge about the offenders and 
their motivation, the target and the opportunity, and the place and the ability. Such 
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analysis on a new data set, however, may uncover groups that are different to those 
identified here. This is because different jurisdictions will likely experience different 
problems, due to different opportunity structures (and prevention strategies that may 
already be in place). In other words, anticorruption agencies need to conduct their own 
analysis of cases in their jurisdiction to uncover what the ‘hotspots’ of activity are, and 
tailor prevention accordingly. The analysis presented in the current paper suggests that 
the crime triangle framework is a helpful tool to uncover such patterns of activity.  It is, 
therefore, important that agencies adequately record the necessary information to enable 
this analysis (Ede, Homel & Prenzler, 2002a).  
 
Further, there can be different ways of conceptualising the elements of the crime 
triangle, depending on the data available and the focus of interest. For example, the 
current study used the sector in which the corruption occurred to explore the ‘place’ 
element of the triangle. As such the analysis revealed which positions were vulnerable 
to which sorts of corruption within the different sectors at the broad level. However, 
place can be conceptualised in a variety of ways. With different data, place could have 
been explored geographically in the traditional sense of hotspots. Alternatively, with 
more data, place could be explored more specifically within a particular sector. For 
example, Ede, Homel and Prenzler (2002) explored hotspots of police misconduct in 
one agency according to the ‘task environment’ by comparing numbers of complaints 
against units of different duty types. Thus ‘place’ was conceptualised by the type of 
work conducted by units within an organisation. 
 
Indeed, corruption follows opportunity, and this is the key next task for this type of 
research – identifying opportunities and their locations.  The present paper has 
identified some places that do experience corruption, and has discussed some of the 
opportunities based around the positions of those involved within these sectors, and the 
kinds of activities they were engaged in.  While it may be a truism that health care 
workers are the ones most likely to engage in health care fraud and municipal workers 
are the ones most likely to engage in municipal corruption, this paper has started to 
identify settings in which this corruption has occurred and to develop a classification of 
how vulnerable positions, activities, sectors and types of corruption all converge.  In 
other words, there are particular structural positions that are related to particular types of 
activity within different sectors. This is a step towards the analysis of corruption 
hotspots and shows that such an endeavour is worthwhile. Further work can now 
progress and refine these findings to uncover more specific opportunities1 through more 
nuanced analysis of populations and variables.  
1 For example, an anonymous reviewer suggested merit in exploring the prevalence of corruption 
among similar positions across different sectors or industries to see if specific vulnerabilities are evident. 
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 Conclusion 
 
In summary, the analysis presented here shows the utility of an analytical approach to 
identifying corruption problems. The identification of three specific themes within the 
data shows that not all corruption cases are the same, but that the main features can be 
distilled into broad types that share common features. The advantage of such 
identification is that prevention can be targeted to such themes. This has potential cost-
benefit improvements over an individualistic case-by-case response, where resources 
can be targeted at multiple incidents but specific features to ensure the greatest impact. 
This research, therefore, provides a re-think of the concept of hot-spots, moving beyond 
places to clusters of activities that can be discerned and appropriate intervention 
targeted accordingly. 
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Table 1: Coding framework of variables and variable levels, and their frequencies 
within the sample. 
Triangle 
element 
Variable  
(from Graycar 
& Villa, 2011) 
Variable levels Frequency 
ƒ             ( %) 
Offender Kind of public 
servant 
involved 
1. Inspector 
2. Low-level worker 
3. Supervisor 
4. Politician  
35 
17 
14 
5 
(49) 
(23) 
(19) 
(7) 
Desire Size of 
bribe/kickback 
1. Low (<$10,000) 
2. High (>$10,000) 
49 
16 
(68) 
(22) 
Target Nature of 
activity 
1. Regulations 
2. Procurement/Contracts 
3. Finance  
52 
14 
6 
(72) 
(19) 
(8) 
Opportunity Process 1. Violation of procedure 
2. Creation of opportunity  
46 
26 
(64) 
(36) 
Place Sector 1. Infrastructure 
2. Human Services 
3. Health & Environment 
4. Whole of government 
30 
21 
20 
1 
(42) 
(29) 
(28) 
(1) 
Ability Kind of 
infraction 
1. Violating regulations 
2. Theft 
3. Abuse of political 
influence  
55 
13 
4 
(76) 
(18) 
(6) 
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Table 2: 26 unique profiles representing the combinations of variable scores for the 64 
cases. 
Offender Desire Target Opportunity Place Ability Frequency 
1 1 1 1 1 1 19 
1 1 1 1 3 1 11 
3 2 2 2 2 2 4 
2 1 1 2 2 1 4 
2 1 1 2 3 1 3 
4 2 3 2 2 3 2 
2 1 1 1 2 1 2 
3 1 1 1 3 1 1 
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
3 2 2 2 1 1 1 
4 2 3 2 1 3 1 
1 1 1 2 3 1 1 
3 2 3 2 2 2 1 
4 2 2 2 2 3 1 
3 1 2 2 1 2 1 
3 1 2 2 2 2 1 
2 2 3 2 2 2 1 
4 2 3 2 4 2 1 
2 1 1 1 3 1 1 
3 1 1 2 2 1 1 
2 1 1 2 1 1 1 
2 2 2 2 2 2 1 
3 1 2 1 1 1 1 
2 2 2 1 1 2 1 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
     TOTAL 64 
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Table 3: Summary of the three groups in relation to how they score on the variable categories (N=64). 
Variable Group 1 
N= 5 
Freq (%) Group 2 
N=14 
Freq (%) Group 3 
N=45 
Freq (%) 
‘Offender’ Politician 5 (100) Supervisor  
Low level worker 
Inspector 
10 
3 
1 
(71) 
(21) 
(7) 
Inspector 
Low level worker 
Supervisor 
32 
12 
1 
(71) 
(27) 
(2) 
Desire High value 5 (100) High Value 
Low Value 
10 
4 
(71) 
(29) 
Low Value 45 (100) 
Target Finance  
Procurement/Contracts 
 
4 
1 
 
(80) 
(20) 
Procurement/Contracts 
Regulations 
Finance 
10 
2 
2 
(71) 
(14) 
(14) 
Regulations 
 
45 (100) 
Opportunity Create opportunity 5 (100) Creation of opportunity 
Violation of procedure 
11 
3 
(79) 
(21) 
Violation of procedure 
Creation of opportunity 
36 
9 
(80) 
(20) 
Place Human Services 
Infrastructure 
Whole of government 
3 
1 
1 
(60) 
(20) 
(20) 
Human Services 
Infrastructure 
 
9 
5 
 
(64) 
(36) 
Infrastructure 
Health & Environment 
Human Services 
21 
17 
7 
(47) 
(38) 
(15) 
Ability Abuse of political 
influence Theft 
4 
1 
(80) 
(20) 
Theft 
Violating regulations 
10 
4 
(71) 
(29) 
Violating regulations 
 
45 (100) 
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Table 4: Example prevention techniques proposed for each corruption group. 
Group 1 Increase the effort  Increase the 
risks 
Reduce the 
rewards 
Politician 
High value 
Finance  
Create opportunity 
Human Services 
Abuse of political 
influence  
Oversight and hearings 
by authoritative 
expenditure 
committees; Media 
vigilance and publicity; 
scrutiny by citizen 
groups 
Financial audit of 
personal and 
business accounts 
Financial 
penalties; 
Moral penalties 
Group 2 Increase the effort  Increase the 
risks 
Reduce the 
rewards 
Supervisor  
High Value 
Procurement/Contracts 
Creation of opportunity 
Human Services 
Theft 
layered decision-
making 
Setting and 
enforcement of 
procurement 
guidelines 
Penalties for 
procurement 
breaches 
Group 3 Increase the effort  Increase the 
risks 
Reduce the 
rewards 
Inspector 
Low Value 
Regulations 
Violation of procedure 
Infrastructure 
Health & Environment 
Violating regulations 
 Oversight of decisions 
 
 Audits of 
decisions relating 
to regulations; 
 Integrity testing 
Financial 
penalties 
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Fig 1: Crime triangle (Carmel-Gilfilen, 2013) 
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Fig 2: Main MSA plot partitioned into three groups. Points represent the 26 different profiles. 
The numbers indicate how many cases are represented by each point (frequency of the 
profile). 
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Fig 3: MSA Item plots. The numbers indicate the variable category (listed under each 
diagram) that each profile point represents. 
                         
 
 
                                 
 
  
4
4
4
4
3
3
2
3
2
3
3
2
3
3
2
1
2
2
3
1
2
2
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
3
3
3
2
3
2
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
Variable 1: Public servant involved 
(Offender) 1= Inspector, 2= Low-
level worker, 3= Supervisor; 4= 
Politician 
GROUP 3 
GROUP 1 
GROUP 2 
GROUP 3 
GROUP 1 
GROUP 2 
Variable 2: Value (Desire)  
1= Low; 2= High 
GROUP 3 
GROUP 1 
GROUP 2 
Variable 3: Nature (Target)  
1= Regulations; 2= Procure-
ment/Contracts; 3= Finance 
GROUP 3 
GROUP 1 
GROUP 2 
Variable 4: Process (Opportunity) 
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